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--- documents:answers:states_control-convention [2015/11/09 09:17] – Oliver Wolcott
+++ documents:answers:states_control-convention [2016/02/01 23:38] – Oliver Wolcott
@@ Line 7: / Line 7: @@
 Robert Kelly, J.D. Staff Counsel, Citizens for Self-Governance
 [[http://www.conventionofstates.com/the_states_control|(source)]]
+{{tag>Runaway_convention Congress_control Ratification Necessary_and_Proper_Clause Article_1_Section_8_Clause_18 CRS JBS Eagle_Forum Trust}}
 Opponents of an [[historicaldocuments:constitution#article_v|Article V]] convention have been repeatedly defeated in their claims that an Article V convention would “run away” <sup>[[#i|(1)]]</sup>. The Framers of our Constitution were wiser than that, and placed numerous checks and balances to ensure the safety of such a convention. Opponents of a convention have since rallied around a new set of arguments claiming that Congress, not the states, will control any Article V convention. Robert Brown’s May 15th article entitled “The Article V Convention as Defined by Article V” is typical of the genre. This argument fares no better than the last. Like the runaway convention argument, it ignores history and substitutes fearful speculation for known fact.
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 This second mode of ratification, however, hardly excludes the state legislatures. As was the case with the ratification of the [[historicaldocuments:constitution-lateramendments|21st Amendment]], state legislatures will be the bodies deciding how delegates to the state ratification conventions will be selected <sup>[[#vi|(6)]]</sup>. Though state legislatures may not be voting directly on ratification, they will still exert significant influence over the process.
-Stepping solidly outside the realm of plausibility, Mr. Brown then states that a third method of ratification is possible, where the convention unilaterally scraps the three-fourths ratification requirement and imposes some lower threshold of its own invention. His basis for this claim is that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 invented a [[documents:answers:jbsqa#was_the_constitution_illegally_ratified|new method of ratification]] for the Constitution, so an Article V convention today could do the same.
+Stepping solidly outside the realm of plausibility, Mr. Brown then states that a third method of ratification is possible, where the convention unilaterally scraps the three-fourths ratification requirement and imposes some lower threshold of its own invention. His basis for this claim is that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 invented a [[documents:answers:answering_the_john_birch_society_questions_about_article_v_jbsqa#was_the_constitution_illegally_ratified|new method of ratification]] for the Constitution, so an Article V convention today could do the same.
 Leaving aside the historical inaccuracies behind this argument, <sup>[[#vii|(7)]]</sup> it ignores a fundamental difference between the Constitutional Convention and an Article V convention. The Constitutional Convention was not called under the Articles of Confederation. The Articles made no provision for such a convention <sup>[[#viii|(8)]]</sup>. Rather the Constitutional Convention was called under the reserved sovereign authority of the states. Therefore, it could do anything which the states allowed it to, up to and including choosing a method of ratification for its own proposals. By contrast, an Article V convention is, by definition, called under the authority given in the Constitution. Therefore it is subject to the procedures and forms laid down in the Constitution, like those for ratification. Mr. Brown and other opponents of a convention gloss over this critical distinction, and consequently err in their analysis.
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 <BOOKMARK:iv> 4. [[http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/5-Natelson.pdf#page=73|See Natelson, at 687]].
-<BOOKMARK:v> 5. To bolster this claim, Mr. Brown and other opponents of a convention often look to a Congressional Service Report that details these past legislative efforts by Congress. Our staff has addressed the CRS report here: http://conventionofstates.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CRS-Response.pdf. The bottom line is that the CRS Report is merely a catalog of past and present Article V efforts and Congress’s response. It does not take any position with regard to those efforts. Unfortunately, the Report ignores much of the research that has been done into historical convention practices, and thus gives an incomplete summary of the topic. But even as written the report does little to support the John Birch/Eagle Forum position.
+<BOOKMARK:v> 5. To bolster this claim, Mr. Brown and other opponents of a convention often look to a Congressional Service Report that details these past legislative efforts by Congress. Our staff has addressed the CRS report here: \\
+[[documents:answers:the_crs_report_on_articlev|(Wiki: The CRS Report on Article V]] \\
+and here: \\
+ [[http://conventionofstates.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CRS-Response.pdf|(PDF) CRS Response]]. \\ The bottom line is that the CRS Report is merely a catalog of past and present Article V efforts and Congress’s response. It does not take any position with regard to those efforts. Unfortunately, the Report ignores much of the research that has been done into historical convention practices, and thus gives an incomplete summary of the topic. But even as written the report does little to support the John Birch/Eagle Forum position.
 <BOOKMARK:vi>6. See, e.g., FL. STAT. § 107.01–107.11; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-18-1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1811–1825.
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 <BOOKMARK:xiii> 13. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 629–30.
-{{tag>Runaway_convention Congress_control Ratification Necessary_and_Proper_Clause CRS JBS Eagle_Forum Trust}}