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--- authoring:cospwiki:cospdocuments:real_answers [2015/10/17 11:06] – [There are Numerous, Redundant Safeguards on the Article V Convention Process.] Oliver Wolcott
+++ documents:answers:real_answers [2017/10/24 17:13] – Oliver Wolcott
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 [[https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/conventionofstates/pages/1003/attachments/original/1424902038/Real_Answers_to_Article_V_Questions.pdf?1424902038|PDF Download]]
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 By Rita M. Dunaway, J.D.
+Tags: \\
+{{tag>con-con Congress convention Constitutional_Convention congress_control convention_of_states Bill_of_rights fear runaway_convention one_vote safeguards state_power proposing federal_abuse}}
+\\
 Beneath the cloud of dust that has been raised by those who will oppose Article V's convention mechanism at any cost, there are real answers to be found to genuine questions and concerns about the process. These answers, as you will see, are grounded in combinations of historical fact, law, precedent, and logic.
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 (1) The scope of authority for the convention is defined by the topic specified in the 34 applications that trigger the convention. These applications are the very source of authority for the convention to begin with. Any proposals beyond that scope would be out of order, and any single delegate could object to their consideration.
-(2) //Even if// not a single convention delegate objected to an out-of-order proposal, and/or //even if //the convention delegates had installed a parliamentarian who refused to sustain an objection, state legislatures can recall any delegates who exceed their authority or instructions. This is because convention delegates are the agents (a legal term of art) of their state legislature and are subject to the instructions given by their state legislature. As a matter of basic agency law, any actions taken outside the scope of a delegate's authority would be void.
+(2) **//Even if//** not a single convention delegate objected to an out-of-order proposal, and/or //even if //the convention delegates had installed a parliamentarian who refused to sustain an objection, state legislatures can recall any delegates who exceed their authority or instructions. This is because convention delegates are the agents (a legal term of art) of their state legislature and are subject to the instructions given by their state legislature. As a matter of basic agency law, any actions taken outside the scope of a delegate's authority would be void.
-(3) //Even if// a majority of convention delegates went rogue, //and// state legislatures failed to stop commissioners from acting beyond their powers, //and// Congress nevertheless sent the illicit amendment proposals to the states for ratification, the courts would declare the proposals void. While the courts don't have a wonderful track record in interpreting broad constitutional language, they do have an excellent track record of enforcing clear, technical matters of procedure and agency law.
+(3) **//Even if//** a majority of convention delegates went rogue, **//and//** state legislatures failed to stop commissioners from acting beyond their powers, **//and//** Congress nevertheless sent the illicit amendment proposals to the states for ratification, the courts would declare the proposals void. While the courts don't have a wonderful track record in interpreting broad constitutional language, they do have an excellent track record of enforcing clear, technical matters of procedure and agency law.
-(4) //Even if// ALL of those protections failed, it borders insanity to think that 38 states (the requirement for ratification) would ratify an amendment proposed under these circumstances.
+(4) **//Even if//** ALL of those protections failed, it borders insanity to think that 38 states (the requirement for ratification) would ratify an amendment proposed under these circumstances.
 ===== Voting at an Article V Convention Will Be On a One-State, One-Vote Basis. =====
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 The argument that our Constitution is the result of a "runaway convention" that was called by the Confederation Congress to "solely revise the Articles of Confederation" is a myth that is easily debunked by an examination of historical documents—the language and date of the Virginia call for the convention, and the instructions given to its delegates as well as the instructions given by the other states to their delegates.
-The Confederation Congress did //not// "call" the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it merely made a recommendation. It had no authority to call a convention under the Articles of Confederation— but the states did retain this authority as an aspect of their residual sovereignty. For a complete discussion, see this [[https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/conventionofstates/pages/145/attachments/original/1410015954/Can-We-Trust-the-Constitution-2.01.pdf?1410015954|article]][[https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/conventionofstates/pages/145/attachments/original/1410015954/Can-We-Trust-the-Constitution-2.01.pdf?1410015954| ]]by constitutional attorney and Article V expert, Michael Farris.
+The Confederation Congress did //not// "call" the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it merely made a recommendation. It had no authority to call a convention under the Articles of Confederation— but the states did retain this authority as an aspect of their residual sovereignty. For a complete discussion, see this [[https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/conventionofstates/pages/145/attachments/original/1410015954/Can-We-Trust-the-Constitution-2.01.pdf?1410015954|article]] [[https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/conventionofstates/pages/145/attachments/original/1410015954/Can-We-Trust-the-Constitution-2.01.pdf?1410015954| ]] by constitutional attorney and Article V expert, Michael Farris.
 ===== Conclusion =====