| Both sides previous revisionPrevious revision | Next revisionBoth sides next revision |
| historicaldocuments:notes-on-nullification-madison [2019/09/15 11:25] – Oliver Wolcott | historicaldocuments:notes-on-nullification-madison [2019/09/15 11:39] – Oliver Wolcott |
|---|
| In the nexplace, the course & scope of the reasoning requires that by the rightful authority to interpose in the cases & for the purpose referred to, was meant, not the authority of the States singly & separately, but their authority as the parties to the Constn., the authority which in fact made the Constitution; the authority which being paramount to the Constitution was paramount to the Authorities constituted by it, to the Judiciary as well as the other authorities. The resolution clearly derives the asserted right of interposition for arresting the progress of usurpations by the Federal Govt. from the fact, that its powers were limited to the grant made by the States; a grant certainly not made by a single party to the grant but by the parties to the Compact containing the grant. The mode of their interposition, in extraordinary cases, is left by the Resolution, to the parties themselves; as the mode of interposition lies with the parties to other Constitutions, __in the event of usurpations of power not remediable, under the in the forms & by the means provided by the Constitutions. If it be asked why a claim by a Single party to the Constitutional compact, to arrest a law, deemed by it a breach of the Compact, was not expressly guarded agst. the simple answer is sufficient that a pretension so novel, so anomalous & so **anarchical**, was not & could not be anticipated.__ | In the nexplace, the course & scope of the reasoning requires that by the rightful authority to interpose in the cases & for the purpose referred to, was meant, not the authority of the States singly & separately, but their authority as the parties to the Constn., the authority which in fact made the Constitution; the authority which being paramount to the Constitution was paramount to the Authorities constituted by it, to the Judiciary as well as the other authorities. The resolution clearly derives the asserted right of interposition for arresting the progress of usurpations by the Federal Govt. from the fact, that its powers were limited to the grant made by the States; a grant certainly not made by a single party to the grant but by the parties to the Compact containing the grant. The mode of their interposition, in extraordinary cases, is left by the Resolution, to the parties themselves; as the mode of interposition lies with the parties to other Constitutions, __in the event of usurpations of power not remediable, under the in the forms & by the means provided by the Constitutions. If it be asked why a claim by a Single party to the Constitutional compact, to arrest a law, deemed by it a breach of the Compact, was not expressly guarded agst. the simple answer is sufficient that a pretension so novel, so anomalous & so **anarchical**, was not & could not be anticipated.__ |
| |
| In the third place, the nullifying claim for a single State is palpably irreconcilable with the effect contemplated by the interposition claimed by the Resolution for the parties to the Constitution namely that of "maintaining within the respective limits of the States the authorities rights & liberties appertaining to them." Nothing can be more clear than that, these auths. &c &c of the States, __in other words, the authority & laws of the U. S. must be the same in all__; or that this can not continue to be the case, if there be a right in each to annul or suspend within itself the operation of the laws & authority of the whole U. S. <wrap hi>There cannot be different laws in different States on subjects within the compact without subverting its fundamental principles, and rendering it as abortive in practice as it would be incongruous in theory.</wrap> A concurrence & co operation of the States in favor of each, would have the effect of preserving the necessary uniformity in all which the Constitution so carefully & specifically provided for in cases where the rule might be in most danger of being violated. Thus the Citizens of every State are to enjoy reciprocally the privileges of the Citizens in every other State: Direct taxes are to be apportioned on all, according to a fixed rule: Indirect taxes are to be the same in all the States: The duties on imports are to be uniform: No preference is to be given to the ports of one State over those of another. Can it be believed, that with these provisions of the Constn. illustrating its vital principles fully in view of the Legislature of Virginia, that its members, could in the Resolution quoted, intend to countenance a right in a single State to distinguish itself from its co-States, by avoiding the burdens, or restrictions borne by them; or indirectly giving the law to them. | In the third place, the nullifying claim for a single State is palpably irreconcilable with the effect contemplated by the interposition claimed by the Resolution for the parties to the Constitution namely that of "maintaining within the respective limits of the States the authorities rights & liberties appertaining to them." Nothing can be more clear than that, these auths. &c &c of the States, __in other words, the authority & laws of the U. S. must be the same in all__; or that this can not continue to be the case, if there be a right in each to annul or suspend within itself the operation of the laws & authority of the whole U. S. <wrap hi>There cannot be different laws in different States on subjects within the compact without subverting its fundamental principles, and rendering it as abortive in practice as it would be incongruous in theory.</wrap> A concurrence & co operation of the States in favor of each, would have the effect of preserving the necessary uniformity in all which the Constitution so carefully & specifically provided for in cases where the rule might be in most danger of being violated. __Thus the Citizens of every State are to enjoy reciprocally the privileges of the Citizens in every other State: Direct taxes are to be apportioned on all, according to a fixed rule:__ Indirect taxes are to be the same in all the States: The duties on imports are to be uniform: No preference is to be given to the ports of one State over those of another. Can it be believed, that with these provisions of the Constn. illustrating its vital principles fully in view of the Legislature of Virginia, that its members, could in the Resolution quoted, intend to countenance a right in a single State to distinguish itself from its co-States, by avoiding the burdens, or restrictions borne by them; or indirectly giving the law to them. |
| |
| These startling consequences from the nullifying doctrine have driven its partizans to the extravagant presumption, that no State would ever be so unreasonable, unjust & impolitic as to avail itself of its right in any case not so palpably just and fair as to ensure a concurrence of the others, or at least the requisite proportion of them. | These startling consequences from the nullifying doctrine have driven its partizans to the extravagant presumption, that no State would ever be so unreasonable, unjust & impolitic as to avail itself of its right in any case not so palpably just and fair as to ensure a concurrence of the others, or at least the requisite proportion of them. |
| |
| Omitting the obvious remark that in such a case the law would never have been passed, or immediately repealed; and the surprize that such a defence of the nullifying right should come from S. C. in the teeth & at the time of her own example, the presumption of such a forbearance in each of the States, or such a pliability in all, among 20 or 30 Independent Sovereignties, must be regarded as a mockery by those who reflect for a moment on the human character, or consult the lessons of experience, not the experience only of other Countries & times, but that among ourselves; and not only under the former defective Confederation, but since the improved system took place of it. Examples of differences, persevering differences among the States on the constitutionality of Federal Acts, will readily occur to every one; and which would e’er this, have defaced and demolished the Union, had the nullifying claim of S. Carolina been indiscriminately exerciseable. In some of the States, the Carriage tax would have been collected, in others unpaid. In some the tariff on imports would be collected; in others openly resisted. In some, lighthouses wd. be established; in others denounced. In some States there might be war with a foreign power; in others peace and commerce. Finally, the appellate authority of the supreme Court of the U. S. would give effect to the Federal laws in some States, whilst in others, they would be rendered nullities by the State Judiciaries. In a word the nullifying claims if reduced to practice, instead of being the conservative principle of the Constitution, would necessarily, and it may be said obviously, be a deadly poison. | Omitting the obvious remark that in such a case the law would never have been passed, or immediately repealed; and the surprize that such a defence of the nullifying right should come from S. C. in the teeth & at the time of her own example, the presumption of such a forbearance in each of the States, or such a pliability in all, among 20 or 30 Independent Sovereignties, must be regarded as a mockery by those who reflect for a moment on the human character, or consult the lessons of experience, not the experience only of other Countries & times, but that among ourselves; and not only under the __former defective Confederation__, but since the improved system took place of it. Examples of differences, persevering differences among the States on the constitutionality of Federal Acts, will readily occur to every one; and which would e’er this, have __defaced and demolished the Union, had the nullifying claim of S. Carolina been indiscriminately exerciseable__. In some of the States, the Carriage tax would have been collected, in others unpaid. In some the tariff on imports would be collected; in others openly resisted. In some, lighthouses wd. be established; in others denounced. In some States there might be war with a foreign power; in others peace and commerce. Finally, the appellate authority of the supreme Court of the U. S. would give effect to the Federal laws in some States, whilst in others, they would be rendered nullities by the State Judiciaries. I<wrap hi>n a word the nullifying claims if reduced to practice, instead of being the conservative principle of the Constitution, would necessarily, and it may be said obviously, be a **deadly poison**.</wrap> |
| |
| Thus from the 3d. Resoln. itself, whether regard be had to the employment of the term States in the plural number, to the argumentative use of it, or to the object namely the "maintaining the authority & rights of each, which must be the same in all as in each, it is manifest that the adequate interposition to which it relates, must be not a single, but a concurrent interposition. | Thus from the 3d. Resoln. itself, whether regard be had to the employment of the term States in the plural number, to the argumentative use of it, or to the object namely the "maintaining the authority & rights of each, which must be the same in all as in each, it is manifest that the adequate interposition to which it relates, must be not a single, but a concurrent interposition. |
| Again, the language of the Report is, "If the deliberate exercise of dangerous powers palpably witheld by the Constitution could not justify the parties to it, in interposing even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, & thereby preserve the Constitun. itself as well as to provide for the safety of the parties to it, there wd. be an end to all relief from usurped power"—apply here the interposing power to a single State, and it would not be true that there wd. be no relief from usurped power. A sure & adequate relief would exist in the interposition of the States, as the co-parties to the Constitution, with a power paramount to the Constn. itself. | Again, the language of the Report is, "If the deliberate exercise of dangerous powers palpably witheld by the Constitution could not justify the parties to it, in interposing even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, & thereby preserve the Constitun. itself as well as to provide for the safety of the parties to it, there wd. be an end to all relief from usurped power"—apply here the interposing power to a single State, and it would not be true that there wd. be no relief from usurped power. A sure & adequate relief would exist in the interposition of the States, as the co-parties to the Constitution, with a power paramount to the Constn. itself. |
| |
| "But, (continues the Report) it is *objected that the Judicial authy. is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constn. in the last resort". In answering this objection the Report observes that "However true it may be that the Judicial Dept. is in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constn. to decide in the last resort, this resort must neessarily not be the last—in relation to the rights of the parties to the Constl. compact from which, the Judicial as well as the other Departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the Delegation of Judicial power, wd. annul the authy. delegating it, and the concurrence of this Dept. with the others in usurped power, might subvert for ever and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitn which all were instituted to preserve" | "But, (continues the Report) it is *objected that the Judicial authy. is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constn. in the last resort". In answering this objection the Report observes that "However true it may be that the Judicial Dept. is in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constn. to decide in the last resort, this resort must neessarily not be the last—in relation to the rights of the parties to the Constl. compact from which, the Judicial as well as the other Departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, __the Delegation of Judicial power, wd. annul the authy. delegating it, and the concurrence of this Dept. with the others in usurped power, might subvert for ever and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitn which all were instituted to preserve"__ |
| |
| * Here is a direct proof, that the Authority of the Supreme Court of the U. S. was understood by the Legislature of Virginia, to have been < > to an interposition of the States agst.of the Al: & Sed; laws. | * Here is a direct proof, that the Authority of the Supreme Court of the U. S. was understood by the Legislature of Virginia, to have been < > to an interposition of the States agst.of the Al: & Sed; laws. |
