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| historicaldocuments:notes-on-nullification-madison [2019/09/15 11:39] – Oliver Wolcott | historicaldocuments:notes-on-nullification-madison [2019/09/15 12:39] – Oliver Wolcott |
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| Thus the Report observes "The States then being the parties to the Constl. Compact, and in their highest sovereign Capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authy, to decide in the last resort, whether the Compact made by them be violated; and consequently that as the parties to it, they must themselves decide in the last resort such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition". | Thus the Report observes "The States then being the parties to the Constl. Compact, and in their highest sovereign Capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authy, to decide in the last resort, whether the Compact made by them be violated; and consequently that as the parties to it, they must themselves decide in the last resort such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition". |
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| Now apart from the palpable insufficiency of an interposition by a single State, to effect the declared object of the interposition namely, to maintain authorities & rights which must be the same in all the States, it is not true that there would be no tribunal above the authority of a State, as a single party; the aggregate authority of the parties being a tribunal above it to decide in the last resort. | Now apart from the __palpable insufficiency of an interposition by a single State__, to effect the declared object of the interposition namely, to maintain authorities & rights which must be the same in all the States, it is not true that there would be no tribunal above the authority of a State, as a single party; the aggregate authority of the parties being a tribunal above it to decide in the last resort. |
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| Again, the language of the Report is, "If the deliberate exercise of dangerous powers palpably witheld by the Constitution could not justify the parties to it, in interposing even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, & thereby preserve the Constitun. itself as well as to provide for the safety of the parties to it, there wd. be an end to all relief from usurped power"—apply here the interposing power to a single State, and it would not be true that there wd. be no relief from usurped power. A sure & adequate relief would exist in the interposition of the States, as the co-parties to the Constitution, with a power paramount to the Constn. itself. | Again, the language of the Report is, "If the deliberate exercise of dangerous powers palpably witheld by the Constitution could not justify the parties to it, in interposing even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, & thereby preserve the Constitun. itself as well as to provide for the safety of the parties to it, there wd. be an end to all relief from usurped power"—apply here the interposing power to a single State, and it would not be true that there wd. be no relief from usurped power. A sure & adequate relief would exist in the interposition of the States, as the co-parties to the Constitution, with a power paramount to the Constn. itself. |
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| "But, (continues the Report) it is *objected that the Judicial authy. is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constn. in the last resort". In answering this objection the Report observes that "However true it may be that the Judicial Dept. is in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constn. to decide in the last resort, this resort must neessarily not be the last—in relation to the rights of the parties to the Constl. compact from which, the Judicial as well as the other Departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, __the Delegation of Judicial power, wd. annul the authy. delegating it, and the concurrence of this Dept. with the others in usurped power, might subvert for ever and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitn which all were instituted to preserve"__ | "But, (continues the Report) __it is *objected that the Judicial authy. is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constn. in the last resort"__. In answering this objection the Report observes that "However true it may be that the Judicial Dept. is in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the Constn. to decide in the last resort, this __resort must neessarily not be the last__—in relation to the rights of the parties to the Constl. compact from which, the Judicial as well as the other Departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, __the Delegation of Judicial power, wd. annul the authy. delegating it, and the concurrence of this Dept. with the others in usurped power, might subvert for ever and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very Constitn which all were instituted to preserve"__ |
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| * Here is a direct proof, that the Authority of the Supreme Court of the U. S. was understood by the Legislature of Virginia, to have been < > to an interposition of the States agst.of the Al: & Sed; laws. | * Here is a direct proof, that the Authority of the Supreme Court of the U. S. was understood by the Legislature of Virginia, to have been < > to an interposition of the States agst.of the Al: & Sed; laws. |
| X printed p. 401 | X printed p. 401 |
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| XFrom this view of the subject, those who will duly attend to tenor of the proceedings of Virga and to the circumstances of the period when they took place will concur in the fairness of disclaiming the inference from the undeniableness of a truth, that it could not be the truth meant to be asserted in the Resoln. The employment of the truth asserted, and the reasons for it, are too striking to be denied or misunderstood. | X From this view of the subject, those who will duly attend to tenor of the proceedings of Virga and to the circumstances of the period when they took place will concur in the fairness of disclaiming the inference from the undeniableness of a truth, that it could not be the truth meant to be asserted in the Resoln. The employment of the truth asserted, and the reasons for it, are too striking to be denied or misunderstood. |
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| More than this, the remark is obvious, that those who resolve the nullifying claim into the natural right to resist intolerable oppression, are precluded from inferring that to be the right meant by the Resoln., since that is as little denied, as the paramountship of the authy., creating a Constn; over an authy derived from it. | More than this, the remark is obvious, that those who resolve the nullifying claim into the natural right to resist intolerable oppression, are precluded from inferring that to be the right meant by the Resoln., since that is as little denied, as the paramountship of the authy., creating a Constn; over an authy derived from it. |
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| The true question therefore is whether there be a Constitutional right in a single state to nullify a law of the U. S. We have seen the absurdity of such a claim in its simple naked and suicidal form. Let us turn to it as modified by S. C. into a right in every State to resist within itself, the execution of a Federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional; and to demand a Convention of the States to decide the question of Constitutionality, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent, unless 3/4 of the states concur in over-ruling the annulment. | The true question therefore is whether there be a Constitutional right in a single state to nullify a law of the U. S. <wrap hi>We have seen the absurdity of such a claim in its simple naked and **suicidal** form.</wrap> Let us turn to it as modified by S. C. into <wrap hi>a right in every State to resist within itself, the execution of a Federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional; and to **demand a Convention of the States** to decide the question of Constitutionality</wrap>, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent, unless 3/4 of the states concur in over-ruling the annulment. |
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| Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results wd. be the same with those proceeding from an unqualified nullification; and the result of a convention might be, that 7 out of the 24 States, might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the U. S. whatever, constructively and give to the Constitution any shape they please, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen, each of the 17 having an equal right & authority, with each of the 7. Every feature in the Constitution, might thus be successively changed, and after a scene of unexampled confusion & distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not as a whole be agreed to by a single party. The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the U. S. and institute a process which is to terminate in the ascendancy of a minority over a large majority, in a Republican System, the characteristic rule of which is that the major will is the prevailing ruling will. And this newfangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of Republicanism, and whose own words declare that "acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it." See his inaugural address. | Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results wd. be the same with those proceeding from an unqualified nullification; and the result of a convention might be, that 7 out of the 24 States, might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the U. S. whatever, constructively and give to the Constitution any shape they please, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen, each of the 17 having an equal right & authority, with each of the 7. Every feature in the Constitution, might thus be successively changed, and after a scene of unexampled confusion & distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not as a whole be agreed to by a single party. __The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the U. S. and institute a process which is to terminate in **the ascendancy of a minority over a large majority**, in a Republican System__, the characteristic rule of which is that the major will is the prevailing ruling will. And this newfangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of Republicanism, and whose own words declare that "acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it." See his inaugural address. |
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| Well might Virga. declare as her Legislature did by a Resolution of 183 that her Resolutions of 98-99, gave no support to the nullifying doctrine of S. C. And well may the friends of Mr. J—n disclaim any sanction to it or to any Constitutional right of nullification from his opinions. His memory is fortunately rescued from such imputations, by the very Document procured from his files and so triumphantly appealed to by the nullifying partizans of every description. In this Document, the remedial right of nullification is expressly called a natural right, and consequently not a right derived from the Const. but from abuses or usurpations, releasing the parties to it from their obligation.* Here insert paper no. 3. as a note. | Well might Virga. declare as her Legislature did by a Resolution of 183 that her Resolutions of 98-99, gave no support to the nullifying doctrine of S. C. And well may the friends of Mr. J—n disclaim any sanction to it or to any Constitutional right of nullification from his opinions. His memory is fortunately rescued from such imputations, by the very Document procured from his files and so triumphantly appealed to by the nullifying partizans of every description. In this Document, the remedial right of nullification is expressly called a natural right, and consequently not a right derived from the Const. but from abuses or usurpations, releasing the parties to it from their obligation.* Here insert paper no. 3. as a note. |
| *No example of the inconsistency of party zeal can be greater, than is seen in the value allowed to Mr Jeffersons authority by the nullifying party; whilst they disregard his repeated assertions of the Federal authority, even under the articles of Confederation, to stop the Commerce of a refractory state, whilst they abhor his opinions & propositions on the subject of slavery, & overlook his declaration, that in a republick, it is a vital principle that the minority must yield to the majority--they seize on an expression of Mr. Jefferson that Nullification is the rightful remedy, as the Shiboleth of their party, & almost a sanctification of their cause. But in addition to yr. inconsistency, their zeal is guilty of the subterfuge of droping a part of the language of Mr. Jefferson, which shews his meaning to be entirely at variance with the nullifying construction. His words in the document appealed to as the infallible test of his opinions are: | *No example of the inconsistency of party zeal can be greater, than is seen in the value allowed to Mr Jeffersons authority by the nullifying party; whilst they disregard his repeated assertions of the Federal authority, even under the articles of Confederation, to stop the Commerce of a refractory state, whilst they abhor his opinions & propositions on the subject of slavery, & overlook his declaration, that in a republick, it is a vital principle that the minority must yield to the majority--they seize on an expression of Mr. Jefferson that Nullification is the rightful remedy, as the Shiboleth of their party, & almost a sanctification of their cause. But in addition to yr. inconsistency, their zeal is guilty of the subterfuge of droping a part of the language of Mr. Jefferson, which shews his meaning to be entirely at variance with the nullifying construction. His words in the document appealed to as the infallible test of his opinions are: |
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| Thus the right of nullification meant by Mr. Jefferson is the natural right, which all admit to be a remedy against insupportable oppression. It cannot be supposed for a moment that Mr. Jefferson would not revolt at the doctrine of South Carolina, that a single state could constituonly resist a law of the Union, whilst remaining within it, and that with the accession of a small minority of the others, overrule the will of a great majority of the whole, & constitutionly annul the law everywhere. | Thus the right of nullification meant by Mr. Jefferson is the natural right, which all admit to be a remedy against insupportable oppression. __It cannot be supposed for a moment that Mr. Jefferson would not revolt at the doctrine of South Carolina, that a single state could constituonly resist a law of the Union, whilst remaining within it, and that with the accession of a small minority of the others, overrule the will of a great majority of the whole, & constitutionly annul the law everywhere.__ |
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| If the right of nullification meant by him had not been thus guarded agst. a perversion of it, let him be his own interpreter in his letter to Mr. Giles in Decr 1826. in which he makes the rightful remidy of a state in an extreme case to be a separation from the Union, not a resistance to its authority while remaining in it.* The authority of Mr. Jefferson therefore, belongs not to, but is directly opposed to, the nullifying party who have so unwarrantably availed themselves of it. | If the right of nullification meant by him had not been thus guarded agst. a perversion of it, let him be his own interpreter in his letter to Mr. Giles in Decr 1826. in which he makes the rightful remidy of a state in an extreme case to be a separation from the Union, not a resistance to its authority while remaining in it.* **The authority of Mr. Jefferson therefore, belongs not to, but is directly opposed to, the nullifying party who have so unwarrantably availed themselves of it.** |
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| It is said that in several instances the authority & laws of the U. S have been successfully nullified by particular States. This may have occurred possibly in urgent cases, and in confidence that it would not be at variance with the construction of the Fedl. Govt. or in cases where, operating within the Nullifying State alone it might be connived at, as a lesser evil than a resort to force; or in cases not falling within the Fedl. jurisdiction; or finally in cases, deemed by the States, subversive of their essensial rights, and justified therefore by the natural right law of self-preservations. Be all this as it may, examples of nullification, tho’ passing off witht. any immediate disturbance of the public order, are to be deplored, as weakeng. the Com[expansion sign]on Govt. and as undermining the Union. One thing seems to be certain, that the States which have exposed themselves to the charge of nullification, have with the exception of S. C. disclaimed it as a Constitutional right, and have moreover protested agst. it as modified by the process of S. C. | It is said that in several instances the authority & laws of the U. S have been successfully nullified by particular States. This may have occurred possibly in urgent cases, and in confidence that it would not be at variance with the construction of the Fedl. Govt. or in cases where, operating within the Nullifying State alone it might be connived at, as a lesser evil than a resort to force; or in cases not falling within the Fedl. jurisdiction; or finally in cases, deemed by the States, subversive of their essensial rights, and justified therefore by the natural right law of self-preservations. Be all this as it may, examples of nullification, tho’ passing off witht. any immediate disturbance of the public order, are to be deplored, as weakeng. the Com[expansion sign]on Govt. and as __undermining the Union__. One thing seems to be certain, that the __States which have exposed themselves to the charge of nullification, have with the exception of S. C. disclaimed it as a Constitutional right__, and have moreover protested agst. it as modified by the process of S. C. |
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| The conduct of Pena. and the opinions of Judges McKean & Tilgman have been particularly dwelt on by the Nullifiers. But the final acquiescence of the State in the authy of the Fedl. Judiciary transfers the authy. to the other scale, and it is believed that the opinions of the two judges, have been superseded by those of their brethren; which have since been & at the present time, are opposed to them. | The conduct of Pena. and the opinions of Judges McKean & Tilgman have been particularly dwelt on by the Nullifiers. But the final acquiescence of the State in the authy of the Fedl. Judiciary transfers the authy. to the other scale, and it is believed that the opinions of the two judges, have been superseded by those of their brethren; which have since been & at the present time, are opposed to them. |
| It remains however for the nullifying expositors to specify the right &. mode of interposition, which the Resolution meant to assign to the States individually. They can not say it was a natural right, to resist intolerable oppression; for that was a right not less admitted by all that the collective right of the States as parties to the Const: the non denial of which was urged as a proof that it could not be meant by the Resoln. | It remains however for the nullifying expositors to specify the right &. mode of interposition, which the Resolution meant to assign to the States individually. They can not say it was a natural right, to resist intolerable oppression; for that was a right not less admitted by all that the collective right of the States as parties to the Const: the non denial of which was urged as a proof that it could not be meant by the Resoln. |
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| They can not say that the right meant was a Constl. right to resist the Constitutional authy: for that is a contradiction in terms, as much as a legal right to resist a law. | <wrap hi>They can not say that the right meant was a Constl. right to resist the Constitutional authy: for that is a contradiction in terms, as much as a legal right to resist a law.</wrap> |
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| They can find no middle ground, between a natural and a Constitutional right, on which a right of nullifying interposition can be placed; and it is curious to observe the awkwardness of the attempt, by the most ingenious advocates (Upsher & Berrian) | **They can find no middle ground, between a natural and a Constitutional right, on which a right of nullifying interposition can be placed;** and it is curious to observe the awkwardness of the attempt, by the most ingenious advocates (Upsher & Berrian) |
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| They will not rest the claim as modified by S. C. for that that has scarce an advocate out of the State, and owes the remnant of its popularity there to the disguise under which it is now kept alive; some of the leaders of the party admitting its indefensibility in its naked shape. | They will not rest the claim as modified by S. C. for that that has scarce an advocate out of the State, and owes the remnant of its popularity there to the disguise under which it is now kept alive; some of the leaders of the party admitting its **indefensibility** in its naked shape. |
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| The result is that the Nullifiers, instead of proving that the Resoln. meant nullification, prove that it was altogether without meaning. X See printed p. 401 | <wrap hi>The result is that the Nullifiers, instead of proving that the Resoln. meant nullification, prove that it was altogether without meaning.</wrap> X See printed p. 401 |
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| It appears from this comment, that the right asserted & exercised by the Legislature, to declare an act of Congs. unconstitutional had been denied by the Defenders of the Alein & Sedition Acts; as an interference with the Judicial authority; and consequently, that the reasonings imployed by the Legislature, were called for by the doctrines and inferences drawn from that Authority, and were not an idle display of what no one denied; by the Legislature due to the occasion | It appears from this comment, that the right asserted & exercised by the Legislature, to declare an act of Congs. unconstitutional had been denied by the Defenders of the Alein & Sedition Acts; as an interference with the Judicial authority; and consequently, that the reasonings imployed by the Legislature, were called for by the doctrines and inferences drawn from that Authority, and were not an idle display of what no one denied; by the Legislature due to the occasion |
| It appears still further that the efficacious interposition contemplated by the Legislature; was a concurring and co-operating interposition of the States; not that of a single State. | It appears still further that the efficacious interposition contemplated by the Legislature; was a concurring and co-operating interposition of the States; not that of a single State. |
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| It appears that the Legislature expressly disclaimed the idea that a declaration of a State, that a law of the U. S. was unconstitutional had the effect of annuling the law. | It appears that the Legislature expressly __disclaimed__ the idea that a declaration of a State, that a law of the U. S. was unconstitutional had the effect of annuling the law. |
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| It appears that the object to be attained by the invited co-operation with Virgina, was, as expressed in the 3d. & 7th. Resol: to maintain within the several States their respective auths. rights & liberties, which could not be constitutionally different in different States, nor inconsistent with a sameness in the Authy. & laws of the U. S. in all & in each. | It appears that the object to be attained by the invited co-operation with Virgina, was, as expressed in the 3d. & 7th. Resol: to maintain within the several States their respective auths. rights & liberties, which could not be constitutionally different in different States, nor inconsistent with a sameness in the Authy. & laws of the U. S. in all & in each. |
| What the effect might have been if Virga had remained patient & silent, and still more if she had sided with S. Carolina, in favor of the Alien & Sedition acts, can be but a matter of conjecture. | What the effect might have been if Virga had remained patient & silent, and still more if she had sided with S. Carolina, in favor of the Alien & Sedition acts, can be but a matter of conjecture. |
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| What would have been thought of her if she had recommended the nullifying project of S. C. may be estimated, by the reception given to it under factitious gloss, and in the midst of the peculiar excitement of which advantage has been taken by the partizans of that anomalous conceit. | What would have been thought of her if she had recommended the nullifying project of S. C. may be estimated, by the reception given to it under __factitious gloss,__ and in the midst of the peculiar excitement of which advantage has been taken by the partizans of that anomalous conceit. |
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| It has been sufficiently shewn from the language of the Report as has been seen, that the right in the States to interpose declarations & protests, agst. unconstitutional acts of Congress, had been denied; and that the reasoning in the Resolutions, was called for by that denial, into the triumphant tone, with which it is affirmed & reiterated, that the resolutions, must have been directed agst. what no one denied, unless they were meant to assert the right of a single State to arrest and annul Acts of the federal Legislature, makes it proper, to adduce that a proof of the fact that the declaratory right was denied which if it does not silence the advocate of nullification, must render every candid ear indignant at the repetition of the untruth. | It has been sufficiently shewn from the language of the Report as has been seen, that the right in the States to interpose declarations & protests, agst. unconstitutional acts of Congress, had been denied; and that the reasoning in the Resolutions, was called for by that denial, into the triumphant tone, with which it is affirmed & reiterated, that the resolutions, must have been directed agst. what no one denied, unless they were meant to assert the right of a single State to arrest and annul Acts of the federal Legislature, makes it proper, to adduce that a proof of the fact that the declaratory right was denied which if it does not silence the advocate of nullification, must render every candid ear indignant at the repetition of the untruth. |
| Yes it may be safely admitted that every right has its remedy; as it must be admitted that the remedy under the Constitution lies where it has been marked out by the Constitution; and that no appeal can be consistently made from that remedy, by those who were and still profess to be parties to it, but the appeal to the parties themselves having an authority above the Constitution or to the laws of nature & of nature’s God. | Yes it may be safely admitted that every right has its remedy; as it must be admitted that the remedy under the Constitution lies where it has been marked out by the Constitution; and that no appeal can be consistently made from that remedy, by those who were and still profess to be parties to it, but the appeal to the parties themselves having an authority above the Constitution or to the laws of nature & of nature’s God. |
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| It is painful to be obliged to notice such a Sophism as that by which this inference, is assailed. Because an unconstitutional law is no law, it is alledged that it may be constitutionally disobeyed by all who think it unconstitutional. The fallacy is so obvious that it can impose on none but the most biassed or heedless observers. It makes no distinction where the distinction is obvious, and essential, between the case of a law confessedly unconstitutional, and a case turning on a doubt & a divided opinion as to the meaning of the Constitution; on a question, not whether the Constitution ought or ought not to be obeyed; but on the question what is the Constitution. And can it be seriously & deliberately maintained that every individual or every subordinate authy—or every party to a compact, has a right to take for granted, that its construction is the infallible one, and to act upon it, agst. the construction of all others, having an equal right to expound the instrument, nay against the regular exposition of the Constituted authorities, with the tacit sanction of the Community. Such a doctrine, must be seen at once, to be subversive of all Constitutions, all laws, and all Compacts. The provision made by a Constn. for its own exposition, thro’ its own Authorities & forms, must prevail whilst the Constitution is left to itself by those who made it; or until cases arise which justify a resort to ultra constitutional interpositions. | __It is painful to be obliged to notice such a Sophism as that by which this inference, is assailed. Because an unconstitutional law is no law, it is alledged that it may be constitutionally disobeyed by all who think it unconstitutional.__ **The fallacy is so obvious that it can impose on none but the most biassed or heedless observers.** It makes no distinction where the distinction is obvious, and essential, between the case of a law confessedly unconstitutional, and a case turning on a doubt & a divided opinion as to the meaning of the Constitution; on a question, not whether the Constitution ought or ought not to be obeyed; but on the question what is the Constitution. And can it be seriously & deliberately maintained that every individual or every subordinate authy—or every party to a compact, has a right to take for granted, that its construction is the infallible one, and to act upon it, agst. the construction of all others, having an equal right to expound the instrument, nay against the regular exposition of the Constituted authorities, with the tacit sanction of the Community. Such a doctrine, must be seen at once, to be subversive of all Constitutions, all laws, and all Compacts. The provision made by a Constn. for its own exposition, thro’ its own Authorities & forms, must prevail whilst the Constitution is left to itself by those who made it; or until cases arise which justify a resort to ultra constitutional interpositions. |
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| The main pillar of Nullification is the assumption that Sovereignty is a unit, at once indivisible & unalienable; that the States therefore individually retain it as they originally held it, and consequently that no portion of it can belong to the U. S. | The main pillar of Nullification is the assumption that Sovereignty is a unit, at once indivisible & unalienable; that the States therefore individually retain it as they originally held it, and consequently that no portion of it can belong to the U. S. |
| But is it not the Constn. itself, necessarily the offspring of a Sovn. Authy? What but the highest pol: Authy. a sovereign Authy: could make such a Constn.; a Constn. wch. makes a Govt. a Govt. which makes laws; laws which operate likes the laws of all other Govts, by a penal & physical force, on the individuals subject to the laws; and finally laws declared to be the supreme law of the land; any thing in the Constn. or laws of the individual State notwithstanding. | But is it not the Constn. itself, necessarily the offspring of a Sovn. Authy? What but the highest pol: Authy. a sovereign Authy: could make such a Constn.; a Constn. wch. makes a Govt. a Govt. which makes laws; laws which operate likes the laws of all other Govts, by a penal & physical force, on the individuals subject to the laws; and finally laws declared to be the supreme law of the land; any thing in the Constn. or laws of the individual State notwithstanding. |
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| And where does the Sovy. which makes such a Constn. reside? It resides not in a Single State but in the people of each of the several States, uniting with those of the others in the express & solemn compact which forms the Constn. To the extent of that Compact or Constitution, therefore, the people of the several States must be a sovereign as they are a United people. | And where does the Sovy. which makes such a Constn. reside? __It resides not in a Single State__ but in the people of each of the several States, uniting with those of the others in the express & solemn compact which forms the Constn. To the extent of that Compact or Constitution, therefore, the people of the several States must be a sovereign as they are a **United people**. |
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| In like manner, the Constns. of the States, made by the people, as separated into States, were made by a sovereign Authy, by a Sovereignty residing in each of the States, to the extent of the objects embraced by their respective Constitutions. And if the States be thus sovereign tho’ shorne of so many of the essential attributes of Sovereignty, the U. States by virtue of the sovereign attributes with wch. they are endowed, may to that extent be sovereign, tho’ destitute of those attributes of which the States are not shorn. | In like manner, the Constns. of the States, made by the people, as separated into States, were made by a sovereign Authy, by a Sovereignty residing in each of the States, to the extent of the objects embraced by their respective Constitutions. And if the States be thus sovereign tho’ shorne of so many of the essential attributes of Sovereignty, the U. States by virtue of the sovereign attributes with wch. they are endowed, may to that extent be sovereign, tho’ destitute of those attributes of which the States are not shorn. |
| In conclusion, those who deny the possibility of a political System, with a divided Sovereignty like that of the U. S. must chuse between a Government purely consolidated, & an Association of Govts. purely federal. All Republics of the former Character, ancient or modern, have been found inefficient for order & justice within, and for security without. They have been either a prey to internal convulsions or to foreign invasions. In like manner all Confederacies, ancient or Modern, have been either dissolved by the inadequacy of their Cohesion, or as in the modern examples, continue to be monuments of the frailties of such forms. Instructed by these monitory lessons, and by the failure of an experiment of their own; an experiment wch. whilst it proved the frailty of mere Federalism, proved also the frailties of republicanism without the controul of a Federal co-organization.* The U. S. have adopted a modification of political power, which aims at such a distribution of it as might avoid as well the evils of Consolidation as the defects of federation, and obtain the advantages of both. X | In conclusion, those who deny the possibility of a political System, with a divided Sovereignty like that of the U. S. must chuse between a Government purely consolidated, & an Association of Govts. purely federal. All Republics of the former Character, ancient or modern, have been found inefficient for order & justice within, and for security without. They have been either a prey to internal convulsions or to foreign invasions. In like manner all Confederacies, ancient or Modern, have been either dissolved by the inadequacy of their Cohesion, or as in the modern examples, continue to be monuments of the frailties of such forms. Instructed by these monitory lessons, and by the failure of an experiment of their own; an experiment wch. whilst it proved the frailty of mere Federalism, proved also the frailties of republicanism without the controul of a Federal co-organization.* The U. S. have adopted a modification of political power, which aims at such a distribution of it as might avoid as well the evils of Consolidation as the defects of federation, and obtain the advantages of both. X |
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| * Add, as a note to this passage, what is at bottom of p. 20 of paper No. 4.) Thus far, throughout a period of nearly half a Century, the new and compound System, has been successful beyond any of the forms of Govts. ancient or modern, with which it may be compared; having as yet disclosed no defects which do not admit remedies, compatible with its vital principles and characteristic features. It becomes all therefore who are friends of a Govt. based on free principles to reflect, that by denying the possibility of a System partly federal and partly consolidated, and who would convert ours into one either wholly federal or wholly consolidated, in neither of which forms have individual rights, public order, and external safety, been all duly maintained, they aim a deadly blow at the last hope of true liberty on the face of the Earth. Its enlightened votaries, must perceive the necessity of such a modification of power as will not only divide it between the whole & parts, but provide for occurring questions as well between the whole & the parts as between the parts themselves. A political system which does not contain an effective provision, for a peaceable decision of all controversies arising within itself, would be a Govt. in name only. Such a provision is obviously essential; and it is equally obvious that it cannot be either peaceable or effective by making every part an authoritative Umpire; The final appeal in such cases, must be to the authority of the whole, not to that of the parts separately & independently. This was the view taken of the subject, whilst the Constitution was under the consideration of the people (see Federalist No. ) It was this view of it which dictated the Clause declaring that the Constitution & laws of the U S. should be the supreme law of the Land, any thing in the Constn or laws of any of the States to the Contrary not with standing (see Art: ) It was the same view which specially prohibited certain powers and acts to the States, among them any laws violating the obligation of contracts, and which dictated the appellate provision in the Judicial Act passed by the first Congress under the Constitution (see Act ) And it may be confidently foretold, that notwithstanding the clouds which a patriotic jealousy or other causes, have at times thrown over the subject, it is the view which will be permanently taken of it, with a surprize hereafter that any other should ever have been contended for. | * Add, as a note to this passage, what is at bottom of p. 20 of paper No. 4.) Thus far, throughout a period of nearly half a Century, the new and compound System, has been successful beyond any of the forms of Govts. ancient or modern, with which it may be compared; having as yet disclosed no defects which do not admit remedies, compatible with its vital principles and characteristic features. It becomes all therefore who are friends of a Govt. based on free principles to reflect, that by denying the possibility of a System partly federal and partly consolidated, and who would convert ours into one either wholly federal or wholly consolidated, in neither of which forms have individual rights, public order, and external safety, been all duly maintained, they aim a deadly blow at the last hope of true liberty on the face of the Earth. Its enlightened votaries, must perceive the necessity of such a modification of power as will not only divide it between the whole & parts, but provide for occurring questions as well between the whole & the parts as between the parts themselves.** A political system which does not contain an effective provision, for a peaceable decision of all controversies arising within itself, would be a Govt. in name only.** Such a provision is obviously essential; and it is equally obvious that it cannot be either peaceable or effective by making every part an authoritative Umpire; The final appeal in such cases, must be to the authority of the whole, not to that of the parts separately & independently. This was the view taken of the subject, whilst the Constitution was under the consideration of the people (see Federalist No. ) It was this view of it which dictated the Clause declaring that the Constitution & laws of the U S. should be the supreme law of the Land, any thing in the Constn or laws of any of the States to the Contrary not with standing (see Art: ) It was the same view which specially prohibited certain powers and acts to the States, among them any laws violating the obligation of contracts, and which dictated the appellate provision in the Judicial Act passed by the first Congress under the Constitution (see Act ) And it may be confidently foretold, that notwithstanding the clouds which a patriotic jealousy or other causes, have at times thrown over the subject, it is the view which will be permanently taken of it, with a surprize hereafter that any other should ever have been contended for. |
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