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| historicaldocuments:notes-on-nullification-madison [2019/09/15 12:35] – Oliver Wolcott | historicaldocuments:notes-on-nullification-madison [2019/09/20 07:22] – Oliver Wolcott |
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| More than this, the remark is obvious, that those who resolve the nullifying claim into the natural right to resist intolerable oppression, are precluded from inferring that to be the right meant by the Resoln., since that is as little denied, as the paramountship of the authy., creating a Constn; over an authy derived from it. | More than this, the remark is obvious, that those who resolve the nullifying claim into the natural right to resist intolerable oppression, are precluded from inferring that to be the right meant by the Resoln., since that is as little denied, as the paramountship of the authy., creating a Constn; over an authy derived from it. |
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| The true question therefore is whether there be a Constitutional right in a single state to nullify a law of the U. S. <wrap hi>We have seen the absurdity of such a claim in its simple naked and **suicidal** form.</wrap> Let us turn to it as modified by S. C. into <wrap hi>a right in every State to resist within itself, the execution of a Federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional; and to **demand a Convention of the States** to decide the question of Constitutionality</wrap>, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent, unless 3/4 of the states concur in over-ruling the annulment. | The true question therefore is whether there be a Constitutional right in a single state to nullify a law of the U. S. <wrap hi>We have seen the absurdity of such a claim in its simple naked and **suicidal** form.</wrap> **Let us turn to it as modified by S. C. into** __a right in every State to resist within itself, the execution of a Federal law, deemed by it to be unconstitutional; and to **demand a Convention of the States** to decide the question of Constitutionality__, the annulment of the law to continue in the mean time, and to be permanent, unless 3/4 of the states concur in over-ruling the annulment. |
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| Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results wd. be the same with those proceeding from an unqualified nullification; and the result of a convention might be, that 7 out of the 24 States, might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the U. S. whatever, constructively and give to the Constitution any shape they please, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen, each of the 17 having an equal right & authority, with each of the 7. Every feature in the Constitution, might thus be successively changed, and after a scene of unexampled confusion & distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not as a whole be agreed to by a single party. __The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the U. S. and institute a process which is to terminate in **the ascendancy of a minority over a large majority**, in a Republican System__, the characteristic rule of which is that the major will is the prevailing ruling will. And this newfangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of Republicanism, and whose own words declare that "acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it." See his inaugural address. | Thus, during the temporary nullification of the law, the results wd. be the same with those proceeding from an unqualified nullification; and the result of a convention might be, that 7 out of the 24 States, might make the temporary results permanent. It follows, that any State which could obtain the concurrence of six others, might abrogate any law of the U. S. whatever, constructively and give to the Constitution any shape they please, in opposition to the construction and will of the other seventeen, each of the 17 having an equal right & authority, with each of the 7. Every feature in the Constitution, might thus be successively changed, and after a scene of unexampled confusion & distraction, what had been unanimously agreed to as a whole, would not as a whole be agreed to by a single party. __The amount of this modified right of nullification is, that a single State may arrest the operation of a law of the U. S. and institute a process which is to terminate in **the ascendancy of a minority over a large majority**, in a Republican System__, the characteristic rule of which is that the major will is the prevailing ruling will. And this newfangled theory is attempted to be fathered on Mr. Jefferson, the apostle of Republicanism, and whose own words declare that "acquiescence in the decision of the majority is the vital principle of it." See his inaugural address. |
| In conclusion, those who deny the possibility of a political System, with a divided Sovereignty like that of the U. S. must chuse between a Government purely consolidated, & an Association of Govts. purely federal. All Republics of the former Character, ancient or modern, have been found inefficient for order & justice within, and for security without. They have been either a prey to internal convulsions or to foreign invasions. In like manner all Confederacies, ancient or Modern, have been either dissolved by the inadequacy of their Cohesion, or as in the modern examples, continue to be monuments of the frailties of such forms. Instructed by these monitory lessons, and by the failure of an experiment of their own; an experiment wch. whilst it proved the frailty of mere Federalism, proved also the frailties of republicanism without the controul of a Federal co-organization.* The U. S. have adopted a modification of political power, which aims at such a distribution of it as might avoid as well the evils of Consolidation as the defects of federation, and obtain the advantages of both. X | In conclusion, those who deny the possibility of a political System, with a divided Sovereignty like that of the U. S. must chuse between a Government purely consolidated, & an Association of Govts. purely federal. All Republics of the former Character, ancient or modern, have been found inefficient for order & justice within, and for security without. They have been either a prey to internal convulsions or to foreign invasions. In like manner all Confederacies, ancient or Modern, have been either dissolved by the inadequacy of their Cohesion, or as in the modern examples, continue to be monuments of the frailties of such forms. Instructed by these monitory lessons, and by the failure of an experiment of their own; an experiment wch. whilst it proved the frailty of mere Federalism, proved also the frailties of republicanism without the controul of a Federal co-organization.* The U. S. have adopted a modification of political power, which aims at such a distribution of it as might avoid as well the evils of Consolidation as the defects of federation, and obtain the advantages of both. X |
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| * Add, as a note to this passage, what is at bottom of p. 20 of paper No. 4.) Thus far, throughout a period of nearly half a Century, the new and compound System, has been successful beyond any of the forms of Govts. ancient or modern, with which it may be compared; having as yet disclosed no defects which do not admit remedies, compatible with its vital principles and characteristic features. It becomes all therefore who are friends of a Govt. based on free principles to reflect, that by denying the possibility of a System partly federal and partly consolidated, and who would convert ours into one either wholly federal or wholly consolidated, in neither of which forms have individual rights, public order, and external safety, been all duly maintained, they aim a deadly blow at the last hope of true liberty on the face of the Earth. Its enlightened votaries, must perceive the necessity of such a modification of power as will not only divide it between the whole & parts, but provide for occurring questions as well between the whole & the parts as between the parts themselves. A political system which does not contain an effective provision, for a peaceable decision of all controversies arising within itself, would be a Govt. in name only. Such a provision is obviously essential; and it is equally obvious that it cannot be either peaceable or effective by making every part an authoritative Umpire; The final appeal in such cases, must be to the authority of the whole, not to that of the parts separately & independently. This was the view taken of the subject, whilst the Constitution was under the consideration of the people (see Federalist No. ) It was this view of it which dictated the Clause declaring that the Constitution & laws of the U S. should be the supreme law of the Land, any thing in the Constn or laws of any of the States to the Contrary not with standing (see Art: ) It was the same view which specially prohibited certain powers and acts to the States, among them any laws violating the obligation of contracts, and which dictated the appellate provision in the Judicial Act passed by the first Congress under the Constitution (see Act ) And it may be confidently foretold, that notwithstanding the clouds which a patriotic jealousy or other causes, have at times thrown over the subject, it is the view which will be permanently taken of it, with a surprize hereafter that any other should ever have been contended for. | * Add, as a note to this passage, what is at bottom of p. 20 of paper No. 4.) Thus far, throughout a period of nearly half a Century, the new and compound System, has been successful beyond any of the forms of Govts. ancient or modern, with which it may be compared; having as yet disclosed no defects which do not admit remedies, compatible with its vital principles and characteristic features. It becomes all therefore who are friends of a Govt. based on free principles to reflect, that by denying the possibility of a System partly federal and partly consolidated, and who would convert ours into one either wholly federal or wholly consolidated, in neither of which forms have individual rights, public order, and external safety, been all duly maintained, they aim a deadly blow at the last hope of true liberty on the face of the Earth. Its enlightened votaries, must perceive the necessity of such a modification of power as will not only divide it between the whole & parts, but provide for occurring questions as well between the whole & the parts as between the parts themselves.** A political system which does not contain an effective provision, for a peaceable decision of all controversies arising within itself, would be a Govt. in name only.** Such a provision is obviously essential; and it is equally obvious that it cannot be either peaceable or effective by making every part an authoritative Umpire; The final appeal in such cases, must be to the authority of the whole, not to that of the parts separately & independently. This was the view taken of the subject, whilst the Constitution was under the consideration of the people (see Federalist No. ) It was this view of it which dictated the Clause declaring that the Constitution & laws of the U S. should be the supreme law of the Land, any thing in the Constn or laws of any of the States to the Contrary not with standing (see Art: ) It was the same view which specially prohibited certain powers and acts to the States, among them any laws violating the obligation of contracts, and which dictated the appellate provision in the Judicial Act passed by the first Congress under the Constitution (see Act ) And it may be confidently foretold, that notwithstanding the clouds which a patriotic jealousy or other causes, have at times thrown over the subject, it is the view which will be permanently taken of it, with a surprize hereafter that any other should ever have been contended for. |
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