| //FERC v. Mississippi//, 456 U.S. 742, 777-78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). This facet of the Texas Plan also would harmonize the doctrine of preemption, in which //Geier //always has been somewhat anomalous. For example, the Supreme Court often emphasizes: "//In all pre-emption cases//, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' . . . we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" //Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr//, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (emphasis added; quoting //Rice// //v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.//, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Given that "all preemption cases" should turn on clear statements from Congress, it makes little sense to allow administrative agencies to preempt state law without //any //statement from Congress (let alone a clear one).)) | //FERC v. Mississippi//, 456 U.S. 742, 777-78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). This facet of the Texas Plan also would harmonize the doctrine of preemption, in which //Geier //always has been somewhat anomalous. For example, the Supreme Court often emphasizes: "//In all pre-emption cases//, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' . . . we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" //Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr//, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (emphasis added; quoting //Rice// //v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.//, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Given that "all preemption cases" should turn on clear statements from Congress, it makes little sense to allow administrative agencies to preempt state law without //any //statement from Congress (let alone a clear one).)) |
