historicaldocuments:anti-federalist:antifed49
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+ | ====== ANTI-FEDERALIST No. 49 ====== | ||
+ | ===== On Constitutional Conventions (Part 1) ===== | ||
+ | ---- | ||
+ | The following essay is in two parts: the first is by " | ||
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+ | That the new constitution cannot make a union of states, but only of individuals, | ||
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+ | Again, the constitution makes no consistent, adequate provision for amendments to be made to it by states, as states. Not they who drew up the amendments (should any be made), but they who ratify them, must be considered as making them. Three fourths of the legislatures of the several states, as they are now called, may ratify amendments - that is, if Congress see fit, but not without. Where is then any independent state authority recognized in the plan? | ||
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+ | And if there is no independent state authority, how can there be a union of states? But is it not a question of importance why the states in their present capacity, cannot ratify the original? I mean, why the legislatures of the several states cannot do this business? I wish to be informed where to find the regular exercise and legal sanction of state power, if the legislative authority of the state is set aside. Have the people some other constitutional means by which they can give their united voice in state affairs? This leads me to observe, that should the new constitution be received as it stands, it can never be proved that it originated from any proper state authority; because there is no such authority recognized either in the form of it, or in the mode fixed upon for its ratification. It says, "We the people of the United States," | ||
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+ | The plan does not acknowledge any constitutional state authority as necessary in the ratification of it. This work is to be done by a mere convention, only in consequence of mere recommendation; | ||
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+ | MASSACHUSETTENSIS. | ||
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+ | ---- | ||
+ | It appears to me that I was mistaken in supposing that we could so very easily make trial of this constitution, | ||
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+ | Lycurgus, when he promulgated his laws to the Spartans, made them swear that they would make no alterations in them until he should return from a journey which he was then about to undertake. He chose never to return, and therefore no alteration could be made in his laws. The people were made to believe that they could make trial of his laws for a few months or years, during his absence, and as soon as he returned they could continue to observe them or reject at pleasure. Thus this celebrated republic was in reality established by a trick. | ||
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+ | In like manner the proposed constitution holds out a prospect of being subject to be changed if it be found necessary or convenient to change it; but the conditions upon which an alteration can take place, are such as in all probability will never exist. The consequence will be that when the constitution is once established it never can be altered or amended without some violent convulsion or civil war. | ||
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+ | The conditions, I say, upon which any alterations can take place, appear to me to be such as never will exist. Two thirds of both houses of congress, or the legislatures of two thirds of the states, must agree in desiring a convention to be called. This will probably never happen. But if it should happen, then the convention may agree to the amendments or not, as they think right; and after all three fourths of the states must ratify the amendments. Before all this labyrinth can be traced to a conclusion, ages will revolve, and perhaps the great principles upon which our late glorious revolution was founded, will be totally forgotten. | ||
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+ | If the principles of liberty are not firmly fixed and established in the present constitution, | ||
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+ | People once possessed of power are always loathe to part with it; and we shall never find two thirds of a Congress voting or proposing anything which shall derogate from their own authority and importance, or agreeing to give back to the people any part of those privileges which they have once parted with - so far from it, that the greater occasion there may be for a reformation, | ||
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+ | The greater the abuse of power, the more obstinately is it always persisted in. | ||
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+ | As to any expectation of two thirds of the legislatures concurring in such a request, it is if possible still more remote. The legislatures of the states will be but forms and shadows, and it will be the height of arrogance and presumption in them, to turn their thoughts to such high subjects. After this constitution is once established, | ||
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+ | AN OLD WHIG. | ||
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historicaldocuments/anti-federalist/antifed49.txt · Last modified: 2021/02/23 16:15 by 127.0.0.1